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Appellant incurred sorne cost in cornply-
ing with the generally applicable sales 
and use tax, the Court noted that Appel-
lant is no rnore burdened by the imposi-
tion of such tax than it is by other 
generally applicable regulations, such as 
health and safety regulations, with which 
Appellant already cornplies. Id 
In its next argument, the Appellant 
contended that under Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the irnposi-
tion of the sales and use tax was violative 
of the Establishment Clause in that it 
"foster [ ed] 'an excessive government en-
tanglernent with religion' ... [by requir-
ing] on-site inspections of appellant's 
evangelistic crusades, lengthy on-site au-
dits, examinations of appellant's books 
and records, threats of criminal prosecu-
tion, and layers of administrative and ju-
dicial proceedings." Id at 697 (quoting 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613). In addressing 
this contention, the Court focused on 
whether the imposition of the tax re-
sulted in an "excessive 'involvernent be-
tween appellant and the State and' 
continuing surveillance leading to an im-
permissible degree of entanglernent," as 
provided under Walz v. Tax Comm'n of 
New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); 
Jimmy Swaggert Ministries, 110 S. Ct. at 
698. In holding that the spirit and values 
of the Establishment Clause were not 
even rernotely at issue in this case, the 
Court noted that 
the [tax] statutory scherne requires 
neither the involvernent of state ern-
ployees in, nor on-site continuing 
inspection of, appellant's day-to-day 
operations ... [and] [rn]ost signifi-
cantly, [it] does not require the State 
to inquire into the religious content 
of the items sold or the religious 
rnotivation for selling or purchasing 
the iterns, because the rnaterials are 
subject to the tax regardless of con-
tent or rnotive. 
[d. at 699. Furtherrnore, the Court re-
jected Appellant's assertion that the col-
lection and payrnent of the tax irnposed 
upon it a severe accounting burden. 
The Court stated that this allegation was 
clearly unsupported by the record 
which showed that any such burden 
was signillcantly eased by Appellant's 
sophisticated accounting staff and corn-
puterized accounting systern. Even if 
substantial, the Court added that such 
record-keeping and adrninistrative bur-
dens do not rise to a constitutionally 
signillcant level. Id. at 698. 
Finally, the Appellant asserted that the 
use tax imposition violated the Com-
rnerce and Due Process Clauses because 
of and insufficient "nexus" between the 
-State and itself as an out-of-state retailer. 
The Court, however, refused to address 
the rnerits of this claim due to the fact 
that the claim was procedurally barred 
under California state law. Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the claim was not 
properly before it. 
1bis case is Significant in that it ad-
dresses a classical first adrnendrnent issue 
pertaining to religion and the free exer-
cise thereof, yet adapts it to a rnore rnod-
ernistic view. Today, rnore and rnore 
evangelists are thernselves excessively 
entangling religious and commercial acti-
vities, thereby making it difficult to dis-
tinguish between the two. However, the 
Suprerne Court has atternpted to rernedy 
this confusion by upholding tax imposi-
tions on the sale of both religious and 
non-religious rnaterials; the determina-
tive test being whether the tax can be 
neutrally irnposed regardless of content, 
whether it acts as a prior restraint on 
religious liberty, and whether any State 
activities in imposing the tax can rernain 
detached and neutral frorn the religiOUS 
organization itself. 
-Cathy A. Cooper 
Ta.Dlin v. Levitt: STATE COURT 
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL RICO 
ClAIMS NOT PREEMPTED 
In Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 
(1990), the United States Suprerne Court 
detennined that state courts have con-
current juri diction over civil actions 
brought under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 
18 U.S.c. §§ 1961.{)8. 
Following the failure of Old Court Sav-
ings & Loan, Inc. (hereinafter "Old 
Court"), the petitioners, non-residents of 
Maryland holding unpaid certificates of 
deposit issued by Old Court, instituted an 
action in federal district court against the 
respondents, fonner officers and direc-
tors of Old Court, the Maryland Savings-
Share Insurance Corporation 
(hereinafter "MSSIC"), fonner officers 
and directors of MSSIC, Old Court and 
MSSIC's law finn, and Old Court's ac-
counting firrn. In the cornplaint, the Pe-
titioners alleged several state law claims, 
a clairn under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 (herinafter "Ex-
change Act"), and a civil claim under 
RICO. The Respondents ftled a Motion to 
Dismiss which was granted by the dis-
trict court for two reasons. First, the dis-
trict court granted the Respondent's 
rnotion concluding that the Petitioners 
failed to state a claim under the Exchange 
Act. The district court also determined 
that the Petitioners' civil RICO claims 
would be disposed of in a pending state 
court action. Because the district court 
belived that state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over these claims, it deter-
mined that federal abstention was 
appropiate. The district court ruling was 
afflrrned by the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Tafflin v. Leritt, 865 F.2d 
595( 4th Cir. 1989). The Suprerne Court 
granted certiorari solely for the purpose 
of determining whether a state court has 
concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO 
claims. 
In reaching its decision, the Suprerne 
Court began by ernphasizing the deep 
rooted presumption in favor of concur-
rent state court jurisdiction. This pre-
sumption is rebuttable only upon a 
showing that: (1) there is an explicit 
congressional statute granting exclusive 
federal court jurisdiction; (2) there is an 
unmistakable implication frorn legisla-
tive history dernonstrating Congressional 
intent to grant exclusive jurisdiction to 
the federal courts; or (3) there is a clear 
incornpatibility between state court juris-
diction and federal interests. Tafflin, 110 
S. Ct. at 795 (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. 
v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 
(1981». 
Applying the Gulf Offshore factors, 
the Court rejected the idea that state 
courts have been divested of jurisdiction 
over civil RICO actions "by an explicit 
statutory directive." Id. at 795, (quoting 
Gulf0jfshore, 453 U.S. at 478). Further, 
as the Petitioners conceded, there was 
no express language in RICO granting 
exclusive federal juridiction over civil 
RICO claims. The jurisdictional grant in 
RICO provides: "[a]ny person injured in 
his business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962 of this chapter 
may sue therefor [sic] in any appropriate 
United States district court .... " [d. at 
796 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c» (ern-
phasis in orginal). The Court found 
Congress' use of "rnay" in RICO presuas-
ive and noted that "[i]t is black letter law 
... that the rnere grant of juridiction to a 
federal court does not operate to oust a 
state court frorn concurrent jurisdiction 
over the cause of action." [d. (quoting 
Gulf0jfshore, 453 U.S. at 479). Accord-
ingly, the Court found the grant offederal 
jurisdiction over RICO cases to be per-
missive, not rnandatory. Id. 
Next, the Court considered the legisla-
tive history of RICO . The Court found no 
evidence that Congress considered the 
question of concurrent state court juris-
diction over civil RICO claims, rnuch less 
any suggestion of congressional intent to 
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the fed-
eral courts. The Petitioners posed two 
argurnents. First they contended that if 
Congress had addressed the issue it 
would have granted the federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction. The Court re-
jected this argument refusing to specu-
late as to Congress' intent. [d. 
Alternatively, the Petitioners relied on 
dicta in Sedima, S.P.R. V.L v. Imrex Co., 
473 u.s. 479 (1985) andAgen0' Holding 
30-The Law Forurn /20.3 ------------------------------------
corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 u.s. 
143 (1987), where the Court noted that 
Congress fashioned RICO after § 4 ofthe 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.c. § 15(a). Relying on 
dicta, Petitioners asserted that because 
§ 4 of the Clayton Act has been interpre-
ted to confer exclusive jurisdiction on 
the federal courts, it should be inferred 
that Congress intended, by the use of 
similar language in RICO, that the Court 
interpret RICO the same way. The Court 
rejected this argument and pointed out 
that "the question is not whether any 
intent at all may be divined from legisla-
tive silence on the issue, but whether 
Congress in its deliberations may be said 
to have affirmatively or unmistakably in-
tended jurisdiction to be exclusively fed-
eral." TaJjlin, 110 S. Ct. at 797. 
Additionally, the petitioners argued 
that to permit concurrent state court ju-
risdiction over civil RICO claims would 
be incompatible with federal interests. 
The petitioners first maintained that fed-
eral interests in a uniform interpretation 
of federal criminal law would be frus-
trated if state courts were permitted to 
hear civil RICO claims. Id. Further, they 
contended that for a state court to decide 
a civil RICO claim would require states to 
determine which federal crimes consti-
tute "racketeering activity" under RICO 
and would thereby create a diverse body 
of precedent interpreting those crimes. 
Id. at 798. The Court rejected both of 
Petitioner's arguments. 
The Court explained that there would 
be no danger of inconsistent interpreta-
tion of federal crimes because, pursuant 
to 18 U.S.c. § 3231, federal courts would 
retain "full authority and responsibility 
for the interpretation of federal criminal 
law." Id. The Court also stated that the 
federal courts would not be bound by 
state court interpretations offederallaw. 
Because this case involved civil RICO 
claims, there was no danger of non-uni-
form imposition of federal criminal sanc-
tions. Finally, the Court indicated that it 
had "full faith in the ability of state courts 
to handle the complexities of civil RICO 
actions, particularly since many RICO 
cases involve asserted violations of state 
law, such as state fraud claims, over 
which state courts presumably have 
greater expertise. Id. 
The Court briefly addressed the 
petitioners' final contention that RICO's 
procedural mechanisms are applicable 
only to federal court actions. The peti-
tioners maintained that RICO provides 
for extended venue and out of state ser-
vice of process which the state court 
systems could not properly handle. In 
response, the Court pointed out that it 
had "previously found concurrent juris-
diction even where federal law provided 
for special procedural mechanisms sim-
ilar to those contained in RICO." Id. at 
799 (citations omitted). The Court found 
no merit in the Petitioners' procedural 
argument. Thus, the Court concluded 
that state courts have concurrent juris-
diction over civil RICO claims. 
In the first of two concurring opinions, 
justice White agreed with the majority's 
holding but wrote separately to express 
his fear that permitting concurrent juris-
diction over civil RICO actions would 
inevitably result in diverse state court 
interpretation of federal criminal law. 
justice White, however, did not believe 
the possibility of non-uniform construc-
tion warranted a rmding of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction. Id. at BOO. 
justice Scalia, joined by justice Ken-
nedy, also wrote a concuring opinion. 
Both Justice Scalia and justice Kennedy 
agreed with the majority's finding that a 
civil RICO claim does not meet any of the 
three Gulf Offshore factors, and, ther-
fore, that state court jurisdicition was not 
preempted. However, neither justice 
Scalia nor justice Kennedy belived that 
the Gulf Offshore factors should be the 
sole criteria for evaluation to determine 
whether state court jurisdiction had been 
preempted. 
Despite some minor disagreement 
among the justices in TaJjlin, a unani-
mous Court agreed that Congress had not 
intended to preempt state court jurisdiC-
tion over civil RICO claims. Not only does 
the TaJjlin precedent confer greater 
power to the states, but it serves as a 
model for evaluating whether state court 
jurisdiction had been preempted. 
-David B. Applefeld 
Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.: 
VOLUNfARILY REfIRED CIAIMANf 
ENITILED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL 
DISABllJ1Y BENEFITS AFfER RETIRE-
MENf 
In Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. 
Co., 318 Md. 624, 569 A.2d 697 (1990), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that a claimant who voluntarily retires is 
entitled to the temporary total disability 
benefits under the Worker's Compensa-
tion Act ("the Act"). In so holding, the 
court reversed the trial court's ruling, and 
upheld the decision of the Workers' 
Compensation Commission. 
Edward Victor, a Proctor and Gamble 
employee, sustained a disability resulting 
from an accidental personal injury arising 
out of and in the course of his employ-
ment. He was first awarded total disabil-
ity, and later, granted a supplemental 
award for permanant partial disability. 
Although Victor was physically able to 
work at the time, he voluntarily retired 
from Proctor & Gamble. Subsequently, 
his work-related condition worsened, 
causing temporary total disability. 
Because of his worsening condition, 
the Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion reopened Victor's case and awarded 
him a continuation of his temporary total 
disability benefits. The Commission, 
however, ordered that the payment of 
the award be suspended pending any 
appeal because it questioned whether 
such benefits, which are ordinarily 
awarded until maximum medical im-
provement is achieved, are available to a 
retired claimant. On Proctor & Gamble's 
appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City, the trial court reversed the 
Commission's ruling, stating that the 
Act's purpose is not to provide additional 
retirement benefits to a claimant who 
voluntarily removes himself from the 
work force. The court of appeals certi-
fied the case before a ruling by the court 
of special appeals. 
In this case of first impression, the 
court began its analysis by looking to the 
Act's purpose. As it had recognized in 
previous cases concerning the Act, the 
court reiterated that "'[t]he general pur-
pose of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act [is] to provide compensation for loss 
of earning capaCity resulting from acci-
dental injuries sustained in industrial em-
ployment. ", Id at 630, 569 A.2d at 700 
(quoting Bethlehem Shipyard v. 
Damasiewicz, 187Md.474,480,50A.2d 
799,802 (1947) (empasis added by the 
Victor court). Futhermore, the Act must 
be interpreted and construed to effectu-
ate this purpose. Id. at 628, 569 A.2d at 
699. The court also noted that there ex-
ists a legislatively required presumption 
in favor of injured employees that their 
claims fall within the Act's provisions. Id. 
at 628-29, 569 A.2d at 700. 
The Act itself, the court noted, estab-
lishes the duties that employers owe to 
their employees, providing, in part, that 
the employer shall payor provide com-
pensation "[flor the disability or death 
of his employee resulting from an acci-
dental personal injury sustained by the 
employee arising out of and in the course 
of his employment .... n Id at 626 n.l, 
569 A.2d at 698 n.l (quoting Md. Ann. 
Code art. 101 § 15 (1985 & Supp. 1989) 
(emphasis added)). Such compensation 
and benefits are referenced to disability 
throughout the statute. Thus, the court 
reasoned, it is the" disability" arising from 
the injury that calls for the compensation 
and benefits, yet "disability" is not explic-
itly defined in the Act with respect to an 
injury arising from an industrial accident. 
Id. at 629, 569 A.2d at 700. 
Thus, relying again on the Act's gen-
eral purpose and the mandate of a liberal 
construction in favor of injured employ-
ees, the court set forth to define the 
legislative intent of an industrial accident 
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